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Victor on the ‘What Happens Next’ podcast: “How Should I Invest My Money?”

March 30, 2023

In the News

Victor on the ‘What Happens Next’ podcast: “How Should I Invest My Money?”

Victor was recently a guest on his friend Larry Bernstein’s What Happens Next in 6 Minutes podcast, along with their dear friend and former colleague, Nobel Laureate Myron Scholes. They discussed their views of the essentials, or Golden Rules, of investing. You can listen to the podcast on Spotify or iTunes, or you can read the transcript of the podcast reproduced below. We hope you’ll enjoy the discussion.


Larry Bernstein: Welcome to What Happens Next. My name is Larry Bernstein.

What Happens Next is a podcast which covers economics, finance, politics, and sports. I give the speaker just six minutes to make his opening argument.

Today’s topic is Intelligent Investing.

Our speakers will be Victor Haghani, who is a former Salomon Brothers colleague of mine and one of the founders of Long-Term Capital Management. A decade ago, Victor founded a wealth advisor, Elm Wealth, as an extension of managing his family office.

I endorse Victor’s wealth management strategy that dynamically manages portfolios of low-cost ETFs focused on delivering attractive risk-adjusted, after-tax returns for clients. You will hear directly from Vic about these ideas and you can learn more from his website, ElmWealth.com.

Our second speaker is Myron Scholes, who won the Nobel Prize for his contributions to options theory, which is just a tiny fraction of his many contributions to finance. Myron will speak today about the importance of diversification both across assets and time. Myron was an early advocate of low-cost index funds and believes that you need to dynamically change your investment portfolio when market risk conditions change.

There is much to cover, so buckle up.

I make this podcast to learn, and I offer it free of charge. If you enjoy today’s podcast, please subscribe from our website for weekly emails so that you can continue to enjoy this content.

Ok, let us begin with Victor’s opening six-minute remarks.

Victor Haghani: My perfect portfolio is based on two core ideas. The first is the golden rule of investing. You can’t expect higher returns without taking more risk – return and risk are bound together – but you can get more risk without getting more return, which leads to an important corollary. You shouldn’t expect higher returns for risks that you can eliminate through diversification. The golden rule is enforced by the competitiveness and efficiency of markets. Everyone is looking for return without risk, the proverbial free lunch, and that makes it difficult to find, if at all. The second rule addresses the ‘how much’ question – it’s not enough to know what to invest in, but we also have to decide how much we want to put at risk in those investments. The answer is that we should choose the portfolio which gives us the highest expected risk-adjusted return, where the adjustment we make for risk reflects our own personal degree of risk aversion.

It follows from the second rule that the higher the expected return you can get for a given amount of risk, the more risk you should be willing to take. This second question of investing gets a lot less attention than it deserves, since it’s actually more critical to get right than the first question. Taking too much or too little risk can be much more damaging to your welfare, even if you make good choices of what to invest in.

I’m just finishing a book that mostly addresses this second question, with my partner in Elm Wealth, James White; it’s being published by Wiley and it will be in bookstores in about six months. People who agree on these two ideas and who have similar levels of risk aversion will wind up with similar portfolios – not identical, but close enough to call them the same for practical purposes.

The first rule dictates that your portfolio should be as diversified as possible, which makes low-cost, broad market ETFs the portfolio building blocks of choice. The second rule calls for changing your portfolio as the expected return and risk of assets change over time. It calls for dynamic asset allocation.

For example, if real interest rates go up 1% but equities don’t move at all, doesn’t it make sense all else equal to increase your exposure to bonds and decrease your exposure to equities? Not only is this the rational thing to do, but it also satisfies the need to be responsive and active, but in a disciplined and systematic way that keeps our cognitive biases at bay, stopping us from chasing whatever is hot and dumping whatever is not, usually at just the wrong times.

You’ll want to get your perfect portfolio at the lowest possible price, meaning you want to pay the lowest possible fees and you want it to be as tax-efficient as possible too, and it should take up as little of your precious time and attention as possible. This last point is very important to me, I don’t want my kids to feel that they have to spend a lot of time managing and monitoring their savings. I want them to see that, even though their father was an investment professional, I didn’t spend my time obsessing over investing and trying to beat the market. Isn’t that what financial freedom really is? And so, that’s how I think about the perfect portfolio. I was 45 years old by the time I truly accepted these ideas, first for my family and then for the clients of Elm Wealth, the wealth advisory firm I founded in 2011. If you want to learn more about these two rules and how they can be put into practice, visit me online at elmwealth.com.

LB: Myron, let’s get you into the conversation. Can you describe your role in the development of index funds and passive investing?

Myron Scholes: In 1968, I was graduating from the University of Chicago, and I was asked by Wells Fargo Bank to apply the Markowitz portfolio theory model to allocating money.

I suggested that, instead of an active manager, the future was passive investing in index funds. From there, it took four years before Wells Fargo could get its first client. But everyone thought the idea of indexing was crazy. No one had done passive investing. That was completely foreign to anyone’s thinking at the time. Now, it represents over 30% of the market, and many other investors who claim to be active really hug the index and do not deviate very far from the index at all. It may be over 50% of investing if you really take the active component out of many portfolio manager’s decisions.

LB: What should be the role of index funds in an investor’s portfolio?

MS: It should be the core of anyone’s investment strategy. That should be the starting point and a particularly wonderful way to invest.

LB: Fees are a real drag on investment returns. Vic, Do you think investors should invest with active managers that charge substantial fees?

VH: Fees has gotten a tremendous amount of study in academia and from practitioners. And the overwhelming empirical evidence is that active mutual fund managers underperform index funds on average. And we even have this concept known as Sharpe’s arithmetic, that says that if you take all active managers and put them all together into a portfolio, that that portfolio would be the market portfolio. And so therefore, the return of all active managers combined would equal the return of the market portfolio, less the fees that they charge.

What’s even potentially more detrimental than just the fees is that when you’re choosing active managers. “Well, if somebody has a good track record, I’m going to invest in them.” And when somebody starts to have a bad track record, they pull the money out. So, this return chasing winds up resulting in investors getting even worse returns then the returns of the funds themselves, this divergence between investor returns versus fund returns. Investors can be doing much worse because they come in and go out at the wrong time in general.

The Cathie Woods Ark ETF is the poster child for this. Since she started back in 2014, the ETF that she runs might now be up 50%, but investors have lost billions of dollars because they got in after it had done well and now it’s down 70 or 80%.

When we pay more for something, we expect that we’re getting something better, and we normally do. A Bentley is a lot more expensive than a Chevy, and sure enough, Bentley is just a better car than a $30,000 Chevy, but investment fees are not really like that.

LB: Next question for Vic: Most wealth managers and mutual funds charge investors around 1 percent, but you only charge 12 basis points. How can you charge clients such a small fee?

VH: 12 basis points, we think it’s the appropriate level to charge for managing a diversified portfolio of assets in a sensible way. We use technology to deliver this effectively. What makes fees high is when you need to hire so-called experts to manage individual stock portfolios. Also in the wealth management business, there’s a lot of concierge services so it just winds up being a lot more expensive.

To the extent that people can unbundle the services that they need from actual investment management and portfolio management, they’re better off.

LB: Vic, you mentioned that you use a dynamic asset allocation model so that if interest rates go up by 1% and equities are unchanged that you buy more bonds and sell equities. Tell us about Elm’s model and your implementation of it.

VH: We think that markets are very efficient and so we don’t believe in individual stock picking, but we do think that it makes sense to change your asset allocation over time as interest rates and equity market risk premium change. And that is not inconsistent with the belief in efficient markets, that interest rates do change is not some market inefficiency. And the same goes with equity market risk premium, that stocks can sometimes offer higher or lower long-term expected returns, is something that makes a lot of sense. The world changes, investors are different than each other and levels of risk aversion change over time. Investors who have flexibility should change their asset allocation over time and that will generate better risk adjusted returns. The way that we do it in practice is really simple.

For equity markets, we use the cyclically adjusted earnings yield as an estimate of the long-term real return that we can expect to earn on equities. And we compare that to the safe asset real return, which is the yield on TIPS, inflation protected bonds issued by the US Treasury. And that difference between TIPS yield and the earnings yield of the broad equity markets is our estimate of the risk premium offered by each big equity market in the world.

We also make an adjustment for the changing degree of riskiness of each of these big equity markets. We use a one-year moving average momentum metric to manage the risk of the portfolio. So, in late 2021, we reduced allocations to equities by quite a bit because equities became more risky, interest rates were going up, equities had negative momentum, market risk was higher. And we reduced exposures then which turned out to be a reasonable thing to do. It’s all transparent rules based, which allows us to charge really low fees. Investors know what to expect because they know what the rules are that we’re using. And we also do tax harvesting and we pay a lot of attention to the ETFs that we use to keep costs down. The average expense ratio of all the ETFs we use tends to be seven or eight basis points.

LB: Myron, do you think passive investors should rebalance their portfolios over time?

MS: A passive investment or an index fund is really an active investment. If risks change, then staying exactly at a benchmark and not trying to adjust your risks is not the best investment strategy. Because our objective is to maximize our wealth subject to risk constraints. The investor doesn’t just want to buy and hold, the investor wants to increase wealth.

LB: You recommend focusing on compounded returns and not average returns. What does that mean and what is its relevance to passive investing?

MS: The index fund or a passive investment portfolio is a starting point. It is a static one period allocation. And every investor wants to increase their compound return. And when we move from a one period average return model to a compound return model, then we have to take account of risk. Risk is a very important component of the growth of your portfolio.

The compound return is less than the average return because of volatility.

LB: Let me give an example. Let’s say you make a positive return of 100% in the first period and lose 100% in the second period. You start with a 100, you have 200 after the first period, and zero at the end of the second period. In the average return is zero return which is the average of plus 100 and negative 100, but the reality is your bust.

MS: Volatility reduces compound return for every level of risk. If one is able to do dynamic asset allocation and keep risk at target that will increase your compound return. That’s what I’ve called, time diversification. And I think time diversification is more important than cross-sectional diversification.

LB: So let me simplify for our audience what you are saying. When most financial advisors speak about the benefits of diversification, they are talking about asset diversification by making different investments: US stocks, foreign stocks, US bonds, foreign bonds, real estate, hedge funds, whatever. And it is true that some risks can be diversified, but all of them are invested at the same time. So, if there is some extraordinary event like a pandemic, all risky assets will fall in value simultaneously because the pandemic undermines the value of nearly everything from an office building in Tokyo to a restaurant in Mumbai.

Myron, you have been a big advocate of the benefits of time diversification. And what you mean by that is that you want to take similar scaled risks for each time period.

If you want to save for your retirement in 25 years, you should take similar amounts of risk for each of those 25 years, so that you can diversify the risk from any one particularly bad period. You do not want to lose most of your money in one catastrophic risky period.

MS: What’s really important are the tails that’s suffering the big losses or missing the big gains. So, risk is really the tails. It’s trying to achieve larger great returns, or it’s trying to avoid great losses. And so, the tails are everything.

And unfortunately, in life, the normal distribution or the idea of mean variance doesn’t include the fact that distributions are really changing all the time, or that risk is changing, and risk management is very important.

It also assumes distributions are normal, but it doesn’t assume that the distributions might have fatter tails at times or might be skewed and are changing all the time. And so, that has to be taken into account in any dynamic risk management strategy that will enhance compound returns. The average doesn’t take account of volatility.

LB: Let me repeat what you are saying. If you are investing for the long run to maximize your wealth, you need to avoid big losses and you need to participate in the big gains. This is where all the major price action comes from.

The second concept is that the level of risk in the market varies each day, so that means you should change your portfolio composition to keep your risk constant. To get time diversification, you need to take around the same amount of risk each period, so you need to adjust your portfolio based on tomorrow’s expected risk.

Myron has been a big advocate of benefitting from time diversification. Vic, how do you think about its application to the asset allocation decision?

VH: It’s a really big contribution that he’s made to focus on time diversification.

Time diversification has a lot to do with maximizing risk adjusted return over time. And we’re believers in the idea of time diversification. We use a risk metric to change our asset allocation, so when the markets become riskier, we reduce exposure and try to keep a more even amount of variability over time, which is exactly what Myron is a proponent of. It’s spot on.

LB: Vic, I want to contrast your dynamic investment portfolio approach relative to what other investment managers are doing. The most common method is something called a 60/40 portfolio allocation between stocks and bonds. This is a product offered by money managers where they put 60% of your portfolio in stocks and 40% in bonds, and then monthly or quarterly, they readjust the portfolios when it’s out of whack. What do you think of that 60/40 strategy?

VH: The one thing it really has going for it is simplicity. The 60/40 portfolio is going to make sense every once in a while when the expected return and risk of stocks and bonds is approximately such as to make sense of a 60/40 allocation for you given your degree of risk aversion.

The better thing to do is make your portfolio be consistent with the expected return and the risk that the market is offering for risky assets, combined with your own personal level of risk aversion, and let that change in a systematic way over time, keeping an eye on fees and taxes.

LB: Myron, what do you think of the 60/40 portfolio recommendation?

MS: People say 60% of your assets should be in equity, 40% in bonds, which I guess is a level of average risk. The problem that I see with a 60/40 strategy is essentially that it doesn’t tell you how to be dynamic. It doesn’t tell you how to adjust.

It reminds me, my first wife who always wanted us to have cushions on our couches. And I said, “Okay, we have cushions on the couch.” But I tried to sit on the couch to use the cushion. No, I couldn’t sit on the couch to use the cushion. So I ask, “What good is the cushion? If we have a cushion and we have a reserve, how do we use the reserve?” And passive management is using the reserve.

Why should I just have the cushion all the time without ever sitting on the couch? And that’s a really important problem. So, there’s myriad issues with that 60/40 strategy in that regard.

LB: Myron, in our house my wife has five pillows on my side of the bed, and I don’t see the point of that either. Let me apply the cushion metaphor to the 60/40 portfolio allocation. Having bonds is like having a reserve to buy stocks after equities fall in price, but we always keep the cash in reserve and never use any more than the allocated extra buying power.

Andre Schleifer has written papers that wealth advisors are value add because they encourage individuals to invest in the stock market, And that otherwise, investors would be too cautious and would hold their money in cash and earn a lower long-term return because of their risk aversion.

Vic, what do you think of the benefit of a wealth advisor that charges 1% that encourages those individuals to invest in equities?

VH: I think the general idea is correct. Vanguard has coined the term ‘Advisor Alpha’ to quantify the idea that having a human advisor between you and your investment decisions can really result in much better portfolio performance over time by getting the asset allocation more correct and from stopping you from doing things. 100 basis points is just way too much for that. Maybe 10 or 12 basis points.

LB: Myron, one of the things I don’t understand is why there’s such a variation in investment management recommendations to the public. Some people encourage using wealth managers, some people encourage using active funds, some people encourage use of private equity. Why are there such different investment recommendations that are often contradictory?

MS: There’s a tremendous amount of data mining. We look at the past. And you can educate people, but if you haven’t experienced something, you completely forget it. I think experience is a great teacher and it’s one of the great things about life, is that all our lives are inductive. We look at the past data and we build models from the past data. So induction or data mining is pernicious. People look at the past, what has worked, that builds their intuition.

If you have theory, then you can add to theory by looking at experience. That’s terrific – but a lot of people take their experience and then they ignore theory.

When I first learned to golf, as Victor knows, I read 150 books on golf, I figured out that I was going to be a tremendous expert because I knew from the theory of how to play golf, how good I would be. And Larry, you know my golf game.

LB: Yeah, I know your game. It isn’t pretty.

MS: The problem is that I got on the course and even though I knew all the theory, my game was so bad relative to theory.

We data mine, we take a subset of reality, and we extrapolate from that. All the information that investors use or in which they think they can make money themselves are always subject to destruction because as you run through time, we find that there’s errors in the model. And as people find errors in the model, they reverse engineer the errors in people’s models and they game against them.

They figure out ways to game against it. The system is dynamic. Everything changes.

LB: These past two years have seen some ridiculous investment behavior with the SPAC craze and the surge in the valuation of meme stocks like GameStop. Do you incorporate seemingly misvalued assets in your portfolio management?

VH: Gene Fama is the biggest proponent of efficient markets. I think that he makes a really great point, there’s just all this stuff that looks totally inefficient and crazy, but it’s really hard to make money from it. That’s the test. I mean, it’s not a test to be able to say this looks ridiculous. The test is, is it easy to make money from it? And I just think that it’s really, really hard to make money from market inefficiency.

Markets are efficient enough that I don’t want to try to benefit from their limited inefficiencies, and at Elm we take it that markets are pretty efficient.

LB: Myron, you won the Nobel Prize for your work with Fischer Black that created the Black-Scholes options pricing model. Some critics complain that the assumptions in your model do not match the real world. One example is the assumption that stock returns have constant volatility over time.

MS: When Fischer and I initially built the technology, we used a theory to replicate an option by a combination of a bond and a risky asset. We also had the idea of changing volatilities but we could not get a closed form solution. In other words, a simple formula you can put in Excel.

Fischer and I decided, “Let’s make some assumptions, okay? Let’s assume the risk free rate is constant. Let’s assume the volatility is constant. Let’s assume that there’s no dividends.” Then we could get a closed-form solution.

So that’s a model. And a model is an incomplete description of reality. Basically, the model has errors to it. That’s by definition what a model is because every model is an incomplete description of reality, even though the theory was exact.

LB: Let’s talk taxes. Taxes are drag on the portfolio performance. Vic, how can investors be tax efficient?

VH: I think that taxes are a first order consideration in how you invest. You want to look at every investment that you’re making on an after-tax basis.

Equities are very tax efficient. You tend to get a lot of deferral, and you get long-term capital gains treatment. Then there’s tax loss harvesting that feels like a low-hanging fruit that most people should avail themselves of.

And individuals wind up in a situation where they have some small set of investments that are very appreciated. They got lucky and they’re up 10x or and they represent 50 or 70% of somebody’s portfolio. In those cases, you have to make decisions about, do I realize some gains, pay some tax and get into a more diversified portfolio versus holding onto this highly appreciated asset with the idea that maybe someday I’ll leave it in my estate, and I’ll get a step-up basis if the step-up basis rules don’t change? Or I just defer the tax for as long as possible or maybe I’m in a high tax state and I plan to retire to Florida, and so I say I’m going to hold it for another five years and then when I move to Florida, I’ll realize the gain.

Having to put a price on the risk of having a less diversified portfolio, having more risk than you want. And what we’ve found is that for highly-appreciated assets that represent more than 50% of your total portfolio, it usually makes sense to pair those back and get more diversified – but, if you have something that represents 2% or 3% of your portfolio and is not having a big impact on your overall portfolio risk, you can leave it there and decide what to do with it in the future.

You might also decide to give it away in charitable giving and get the deduction on the market value and never have to pay that capital gain. Taxes are really, really important.

LB: Myron, when should we sell our winners and recognize income for tax purposes?

MS: The government is our partner. If I can make abnormal returns, then I can make 12% and the government’s going to take 6%. I’m better off paying the government 6% than making nothing. You have to be rational. Our object is to maximize our expected compound return after tax.

We have to be dynamic in our asset allocation to maximize our lifetime consumption, which includes not only our own consumption but the consumption of others.

A lot of investors incur taxes as they’re adjusting their portfolio because their circumstances changed.

LB: Let’s assume that you’re a wealthy taxpayer living in a high tax state at the 50% tax rate. If that taxpayer invests in a hedge fund with a 2% management fee and a 20% incentives fee. Under current tax law, the 2% management fee would not be tax deductible. Let’s assume they have a gross return before fees of 10%. The total fees are 3.6% and the taxes would be an additional 4.2%, so the investor only gets a 2.2% after-tax return.

Vic, what do you think of the after-tax economics for a hedge fund investment?

VH: I don’t think there’s anything for me to say, is there? I don’t think these vehicles make sense for highly-taxed, affluent US investors.

LB: Next question is on international diversification. Right now, we’ve had this period where US equities have done so well and we have people like Warren Buffett just telling people, “Put all your equity exposure into the S&P 500. That’s good enough.” Myron, What do you think about international diversification?

MS: Obviously, international diversification reduces idiosyncratic risk. We’re part of a global world, if you just hold assets in the S&P 500, then you are not as diversified.

The world is not only the United States or assets in the S&P 500. The world includes China, the world includes Japan, the world includes Europe. The world includes a tremendous amount of other investment opportunities and why preclude ourselves from adding them into the equilibrium portfolio?

There are benefits, obviously, through diversification and there’s myriad ways to achieve this diversification very inexpensively now. And so, investors should include that in their portfolio.

LB: Vic, in the 1990s we both worked in Salomon Brothers’ Tokyo Proprietary Trading Department. I was flabbergasted by how high the Price to Earnings ratios were in Japan at that time and how low the expected equity returns were available to investors. Americans had little exposure to the Japanese stock market, and almost all Japanese equities were then owned by Japanese individuals.

And I said to myself at the time, “It’s a big world out there. I don’t need to own these Japanese stocks. I’ll leave that for the Japanese.” How has that experience shaped your views on international diversification?

VH: When I designed Elm Wealth, the Japanese experience was in my thinking – and not only does the Japanese experience make me want to be eyes open about what I’m investing in, rather than just purely market cap weighted, I wanted to be forward looking.

Different big markets can offer very meager or sometimes very attractive long-term expected returns, and we should be able to avail ourselves of everything that’s happening in the world. I’m a strong believer in international diversification.

That doesn’t mean that you always want to have a lot of non-US equities. It just means that you want to be looking at the whole world to build your portfolio and not just invest in my home market because it’s my home market.

LB: Ibbotson analyzed 120 years of financial returns for stocks and bonds. Myron, what do you think of the past 120 years as a predictor for the future and whether stocks will continue to outperform other assets?

MS: We think of the return on equities as having a premium over the return on safe assets. I expect to earn a higher return on investing in risky assets that are correlated with my future consumption needs. And that’s basic theory.

Expectations, however, are different from realizations. This is an interesting argument in finance that if I have a long horizon, I should be in equities and not in cash or bonds. Okay? That’s the argument. By investing in equities, I’m virtually certain to outperform investing in bonds or cash over this long horizon period. And then you say, “Virtually certain? Wow, that’s great.” If I can invest in stock over this 20-year period, there’s some chance that if I keep my money in stocks, I could lose 60% or 70% of my money. So, if someone is going to make it virtually certain, it’s not the mean that counts, it’s the distribution around the mean that counts. What’s the shortfall going to be? That’s what you want to ensure against in life. It’s the shortfall. Not that I’m going to on average outperform someone. When is a shortfall going to occur? What am I going to do if the shortfall does occur? Can I stay in the game for 20 years? Those are important questions.

So, it means what risk you take and how you dynamically adjust your risk is a crucial aspect.

LB: Vic, how does the Ibbotson’s 120-year historical analysis shape your thinking about investing in equities for the long run?

VH: I would say very little for two reasons. First, 120 years is actually not that much data for trying to estimate a process that itself is moving around and where each year equities have 18% variability. 120 years is just not that long even if the world didn’t change over that period and we were just trying to estimate something like a coin flip out of it. The more important thing is that we need to look prospectively into the future.

If we’re going to buy a 10-year bond, we just need to look at the yield of that bond to know what return we should expect over the next 10 years from owning that bond. It’s called yield to maturity. We don’t care what was the return on bonds over the last 100 years because we just care about what its yield is today, not what the return was.

And the same goes for equities. Like the fact that equities were trading at a P/E of 10 at many times in the first half of the 20th century means that their returns were going to be pretty high for the next 50 years. We need to look at what’s the P/E today. We need to be looking into the future, looking at cash flows, looking at promised yields on bonds to make our asset allocation decisions. We should make our decisions with what the markets are offering us today, not what the returns have been in the past. We need to be looking to the future, not in the rearview mirror to do our asset allocation. And that’s why our asset allocation should change over time, because what the market offers is changing over time.

LB: How do you determine how to allocate between stocks, bonds, and other assets in your Elm portfolio model?

VH: The ideal portfolio is an individual specific choice depending on your degree of risk tolerance for a given amount of expected excess return offered by risky assets. You’re going to want to have a different amount of exposure than somebody else with a different degree of risk aversion. At Elm, we have a baseline product that we offer to people. And if that doesn’t really match their risk tolerance, then Elm can make their total portfolio less risky, like having more fixed income. Also, we do customized portfolios for people to their level of risk aversion.

We want everything that we put into people’s portfolios to be low-cost, diversified, and big asset classes where we can have some idea of measuring the expected returns in the future. We tend to stay away from things that are not liquid.

We recognize that people will be attracted to other kinds of investments. And we just accept that that’s not going to be part of what we’re doing for them, and they need to do that on the side.

LB: Vic, what assets are the building blocks in portfolio design, and how do you implement that strategy for your Elm clients?

VH: We have a really simple offering, for US investors, we open an account at Fidelity or Schwab and we manage their account for them. They can put money in, take money out whenever they want, they get statements directly from Fidelity or the other brokers – it’s their account and it’s in their name, and anytime they want to remove us, that’s it, they just remove us and everything stays the same, there’s no realizations. We rebalance their portfolios on a weekly basis, moving towards our ever-changing targets, where our targets are evolving with changes in the expected return and riskiness of about 10 major asset classes.

LB: Tell us about some of the free tools that you have on your website to help investors figure out their own risk tolerance and other key ingredients to portfolio design?

VH: We have a bunch of interactive tools on our website, elmwealth.com. We have apps that can give you the historical returns on a daily basis of our different strategies that you can download and analyze. We have historical asset allocation that shows our different strategies over time.

Our most popular app on our website is a coin-flipping game where you can flip a coin which is biased 60/40 and see how you manage the risk of that over time or over a number of flips. And that’s hugely popular. Sometimes we get 100 playing that in a day. And that’s really very educational for people to just get a sense for what is randomness and what is it like to have an edge of 60/40 and how do I manage something like that over time.

We also have some tools that help with tax decisions like we were talking about earlier. If you have an appreciated asset and you’re trying to figure out what’s the optimal amount to reduce and pay taxes on today, you can put in expectations of future tax rates and come to useful answers.

And a lifetime consumption and portfolio choice tool which helps people to think about wealth and longevity and optimal investment and spending policies. It allows people to make better decisions about how much risk to take in their portfolios and what kind of spending policy makes sense.

LB: What are you optimistic about the field of finance?

MS: If I just got out of university at this moment, I would go into finance again. Finance is uncertainty. Uncertainty is the cornerstone of all our lives. It’s the cornerstone of everything we do, and understanding uncertainty, or how to think about uncertainty, is just unbelievably fascinating. It’s been fascinating for philosophers.

I’m so excited about uncertainty and how finance adds to it. The greatest investment you can do is keep educating your brain, keep building your human capital and try to preserve it. Eating the correct way, living life the correct way, loving the correct way, physical exercise.

And then types of investment are always changing. We’re always learning about how to make better investments, and that’s what’s exciting. If the world was static, I’d be bored. If the world is dynamic, I enjoy it. And the information set is so large, it allows us to keep learning and keep growing, because there’s so much learning that we still have ahead.

LB: Myron, what is unusual about your optimism is that it runs counter to risk aversion in finance theory. Normally, uncertainty makes us scared. Uncertainty in asset returns encourages us to hold more cash and fewer risky assets. Uncertainty is viewed as a negative, but you just said that uncertainty was a beautiful thing.

This reminds me of an episode of the TV show The Twilight Zone. Here’s the plot of the relevant show.

A guy dies. He wakes up wearing a tuxedo in a casino. He is thrilled because he loves casinos. He walks over to the roulette wheel and bets on red. It’s red and he wins. Then, he bets on 12. It’s 12. So, he moves away from the roulette wheel a winner and heads over to the bar where a pretty girl is seated. He orders a drink, and he makes a move on the girl, and he gets the girl.

This goes on day after day. He sees the manager. “Hey pit boss, do you have a second? I want to talk to you.” And he says, “Sure, what’s up?”

“Listen, is it possible that you can change things around here, so I don’t win every bet. If I bet on red, how about it comes up black every so often? I bet on 12, it comes up 14. I go to the bar, I try to pick up the girl, I’m a little fresh. She throws the drink in my face. Okay? How about a little bit of that? Winning every time, it’s no good. Can you throw me a bone.” This is how I think heaven should be. And the pit boss says, “who told you this was heaven?”

MS: That’s correct. This is a story I always thought about.

LB: Vic, what are you optimistic about?

VH: People have been making better financial decisions over time. If you go back to the 1950s or 1960s, there’s a Fed study that found that the median number of stocks that were held in an individual’s brokerage account was two. Back then, people just didn’t get diversification at all.

Today, the use of broadly-diversified index funds has become so prevalent among individual investors. We’re just moving in the right direction with regard to people making better financial decisions for themselves. Now, there’s bumps along the way – the whole meme stock thing in 2020 and 2021 was disheartening for me – but overall, we’re on a great trajectory for people making better and better financial decisions, people being more disciplined in what they’re doing, and new technologies that are helping people to make better decisions with lower fees. What we do at Elm, we couldn’t have done 20 years ago because of technology, because of the low-cost broad index funds that are covering all major asset classes. I’m optimistic on better financial outcomes for more people as we go through time.

LB: Thanks to Vic and Myron for joining us today. If the ideas we just discussed resonate with you, visit elmwealth.com where you can find a lot of relevant research and tools, and where you can get in touch with Vic and his team for a deeper dive.

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Victor on MoneyTree Investing

May 4, 2022

In the News

Victor on MoneyTree Investing

Victor was recently featured on MoneyTree’s podcast, which focuses on providing education and information for investors. The following is an excerpt from his conversation with host Kirk Chisholm. You can also listen to the audio on Spotify or via MoneyTree (Victor is on for the first 35 minutes or so).


Kirk Chisholm: Victor, tell us a little bit about your background, you know, how you got to where you are today.

Victor Haghani: I started off straight out of university going to work for Salomon Brothers in New York in 1984, working in fixed income research, the bond portfolio analysis group, and eventually wound up on the government arbitrage desk and working for John Meriwether. And when John went to set up LTCM, I followed him and was a founding partner there, and moved with my wife to London where we lived and raised our family until a few years ago. In 2001, I decided to take a long sabbatical from finance for about 10 years.

And I realized that I was just not doing a very good job of managing my family’s wealth. I tried out a couple of different approaches. First I tried to do what I saw a lot of friends who I respected doing, which was to try to beat the market, investing in hedge funds and private equity and angel deals in VC and various one-off trades, and so on.

And I just felt that it wasn’t for me. It was too much work. It was very tax inefficient. I think that the risk/return wasn’t even that great. So, I was attracted back to the basics of wanting to be invested in a very diversified, long-only portfolio. I started to move my family’s savings into a portfolio of low cost, broad market index funds. As I was doing that, I realized that there were a few questions that anybody moving in that direction needs to answer for themselves.

Questions such as, what should my allocation to equities be? What should my allocation to non-US equities be? Which different buckets make sense to have? Should I choose a static allocation and stick with that forever? Or should I change the allocation in some way as circumstances change?

As I thought about those questions for myself and my family through discussing it with my friends, I started to realize that other people wanted to move in this direction too. But they didn’t really want to spend a lot of time implementing the sort of framework of managing a portfolio of low-cost ETFs and index funds and doing tax loss harvesting and the like, so a business was born. It started off with my family as the first client, then a dozen or so friends invested. This was back in early 2012.

KC: You mentioned LTCM, and your time with John Meriwether. Maybe you can talk a little bit about your experience there and what you learned from that experience.

VH: I think that for me personally, what came out of it was around the question of what decisions did I personally make, and how did I think about them? The biggest decision for me and my family was how much of my family’s savings to invest in the Fund we were managing. I owned a partnership interest in the management company, but how much did I want to invest in the Fund?

As you know, we had a bad outcome, but it seemed like a really good investment–it was a reasonable position to believe that the expected return of the fund was maybe 10% to 15% and the annual standard deviation was 15%. Something like a sharp ratio of 1.0 or 0.75 seemed pretty reasonable as an expectation for what we were doing. Investing in equities, maybe that has a Sharpe Ratio of just 0.3 or 0.4. On top of that, we didn’t have to pay an incentive fee.

So here’s this great thing. How much should I have invested in it? How should I have thought about that? One possible answer is, well, just invest as much as you can because it’s so good. The more that you invest, the higher is your expected wealth. If you could get leverage, that would lead you to a higher amount of expected wealth in the future.

But what came out of the experience for me was that expected wealth really wasn’t the thing that I should have been trying to optimize. I should have been trying to optimize for some sort of risk-adjusted or certainty-equivalent wealth, in economic speak. I should have been trying to maximize expected utility, which is taking account of the fact that the marginal benefit of more and more money to me was decreasing. And if I lost money, it was going to be increasingly painful.

If I had really thought about it more like that at the time, I would’ve invested less.

I think that when you find a good investment, that’s an important part of successful investing, but it’s possible to own too much of it — even if it ultimately turns out to be a great investment. With LTCM, within about 12 to 18 months after October of ‘98, most of the positions worked out well. Most of them, not all of them, ultimately performed as we expected when we put them on.

So, if you find a really good investment but you own too much of it, you can actually go bankrupt. It’s the same with equity markets: If you’re sitting there in the year 1900, and you know that equities are going to give you a 10% return for the next 120 years, well, that’s great.

What should you do? What if you could get five times leverage on that? And you think, well, that sounds great – I’m going to have all the money in the world after 120 years, or my great-grandchildren will. But no, with five times leverage you would’ve been wiped out several times. So that’s not the right strategy.

KC: So how do you look at position sizing?

VH: I think that the approach to take is to start by calibrating your personal level of risk aversion. And there are a lot of different ways of doing it—let’s say you’ve done that.

A basic principle is don’t take risks that you’re not getting compensated for. Given that it’s nearly costless to own low cost, broad index funds and ETFs from Vanguard or iShares, why not avail yourself of that? Why take idiosyncratic risk from being in a concentrated portfolio if there’s a good chance that you’re probably not getting compensated for it?

Risk is a tangible cost to me, just as much as paying fees. If I have to take more risk, that’s like actual money out the door. It’s not quite the equivalent, I’m not actually paying anybody for the risk I’m taking, but I should almost have a little bank account when I take risk. I should have to put money into it for taking the risk and evaluate the things that I’m doing with the assumption I have to pay for taking risk.

KC: You mentioned asymmetric risk. It’s a topic that the experts don’t talk about enough, but yet it’s kind of the baseline for a lot of investing, certainly on an institutional level or at your level.

VH: It’s reasonable to have a preference for positively asymmetric payoffs versus negatively asymmetric ones. A positively asymmetric payoff pattern is one where there’s a high probability of a small loss and a low probability of a large gain, like buying a lottery ticket or out of the money call option on a risky asset. Given a Sharpe Ratio for that, if you have another trade with the same Sharpe Ratio but it has a small probability of a big loss and a large probability of a small gain, we prefer the former. I think one of the things that you want to try to do is to stay away from catastrophic downside risks.

So that’s the starting point, that it is reasonable and sensible to have a preference for positively asymmetric investments compared to negatively asymmetric ones.

Seems kind of obvious, but many people are tempted to buy a bond if it has a promised extra return of 4% or 5% because people perceive the credit as kind of shaky, but it’s very likely they’re going to pay it back. You’re getting this extra 4% return because they might not, and if they don’t, you’re going to lose a lot of money. But the attraction of the promised yield, the yield that you can almost tangibly put your hands on, leads people to take some of these negatively asymmetric tail bets that are really a problem for wealth accretion.

That brings us into talking about options. They can be helpful sometimes in trying to cut off negative tails or trying to create positive tails, but for individual investors, I think they’re really hard to analyze.

At the end of the day, the options market is a zero-sum activity. You know that everybody who buys a call option is buying it from somebody who’s selling them a call option, same for puts and so on. I think that the idea that you’re getting in on something good with options is something to be a little bit skeptical about. There are times and places where protecting your positions with out of the money put options, or trying to get some positive asymmetry into your portfolio with call options, can make sense. And often it’s a lot better than other alternatives. I’d much rather see somebody buy out of the money calls on the stock market than buy two week call options on Tesla, or even to just buy Tesla for that matter. I’d rather see somebody at least get the diversification of the stock market through the options mechanism, then have a concentrated position in a couple of highly volatile stocks.

In general, I think it makes sense to just have an amount of equities that you’re comfortable with rather than having more than that and then trying to buy and roll put options on the portfolio. It feels more comfortable to me to do that.

KC: When you’re looking for improved asset allocation, how are you doing that? Because everyone looks at asset allocation as a good risk management tool, but how are you doing that differently so that you can say this is a better version of what other people are doing?

VH: As far as we know, outside of Elm there’s no purely algorithmic, dynamic, low-cost asset allocation product available for individual investors out there. If you would use a Betterment or WealthFront, they’ll put you into a static portfolio that they feel meets your risk tolerance and your goals and so on, but they don’t change that as market conditions are changing.

Our view, and it’s really a pretty standard in the research and academic communities, is that the expected return of the stock market changes over time. The earnings yield is a reasonable predictor of the long term, real return of a broad stock market. And the decision that we need to make is how much to put in the stock market and how much to not have in the stock market.

That’s the main decision that I’m making with my family’s savings, and our clients’ savings. I’m not worried about a lot of other asset classes. The main ones are stocks and a safe asset. Now for me, the safe asset really is TIPS. I want to take my wealth and spend it for the rest of my life and give some to my kids and have them spend it for their lives and so on. I want a real, inflation-protected stream of consumption over my life. And so actually I find that long-term TIPS are a safer asset for me than owning Treasury Bills. You’ve lost 25% percent of your purchasing power by being in Treasury Bills over the last 10 years or so. And in the 1940s into the early ‘50s Treasury Bills lost 35% to 40% of their purchasing power.

That’s the same as just losing your money. There’s no difference between that and just losing the money and then keeping up with inflation. At Elm, we say, okay, let’s look at earnings yield minus the yield on TIPS and we’re going to increase or decrease our allocation to equities based on that.

We also care about risk. So, the riskier the stock market is, the less we want to own. The less risky it is, the more we want to own. We need some sort of metric for the riskiness of the market. What we decided to use is a momentum metric: the one year moving average of the market versus today’s level.

That’s a decent, simple proxy for risk. When momentum is negative, generally the market’s riskier and we want to reduce positions, and vice versa. So, for example, since October of 2021 we’ve been reducing our allocation to equities as momentum in more and more of the global equity markets has gone negative. Almost all major risk assets are in this negative momentum territory. So we want to be underweight for that, but we also want to take account of the long term earnings yield minus TIPS rate, which is pretty attractive right now.

That means that altogether, we’re underweight versus our baselines by about 15%. We’re 60% in equities right now, which is this balance between the markets being sort of risky because momentum is negative on the one hand, and the earnings yield minus the TIPS rate on the global equity market being 6% or 5% right now, which is a lot of extra expected return relative to the safe asset.


For more of the conversation, please listen on Spotify or via MoneyTree (Victor’s segment runs for about the first 35 minutes).

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Victor a Guest on Bloomberg’s Trillions Podcast: The Road to Index Investing

June 1, 2021

In the News

Victor a Guest on Bloomberg’s Trillions Podcast: The Road to Index Investing

Victor was recently a guest on Bloomberg’s Trillions podcast with Joel Weber and Eric Balchunas, discussing his long road from the trading desks at Salomon Brothers to LTCM to Elm’s inception and subsequent expansion.

You can also listen to the episode on iTunes.


For more on the topics discussed in the episode:

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Elm research wins Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy Award

March 19, 2021

In the News

Elm research wins Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy Award

Last year, the Journal of Portfolio Management published our paper on factor investing, ‘Smart Beta: The Good, the Bad and the Muddy.’

It’s since become one of our most popular pieces, and we’re happy to announce that the paper has been awarded the Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy Award for Outstanding Article.

For anyone who may have missed it, you can view the full paper here.

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A Conversation with NYU Professor Aswath Damodaran

May 6, 2019

In the News

A Conversation with NYU Professor Aswath Damodaran

April 23, 2019 – New York City 1

Victor recently sat down with NYU Professor Aswath Damodaran to hear his views on some of the most passionately debated topics in investing today, from the rise of indexing and what it means for market efficiency, to the origins and theoretical underpinnings of factor investing, to why investors ignore momentum at their peril.

Aswath Damodaran is Professor of Finance at the Stern School of Business at NYU. He received his Ph.D. in 1985 in Finance from UCLA, and has been making important contributions to our understanding of finance ever since, earning myriad awards for his research and his teaching along the way. His excellence in the classroom has resulted in many teaching awards and has been voted “Professor of the Year” by the graduating M.B.A. class five times during his career at NYU. Professor Damodaran is the author of eleven books, including several widely-used text books on Valuation, Corporate Finance and Investment Management.

You can follow Aswath on his Musings on Markets blog, his website, his incredibly popular YouTube channel or @AswathDamodoran on twitter.


Victor Haghani: Going back 30 years to when you were starting out as a professor, do you feel that there has been a change in the makeup of market participants? I mean, have we seen a change towards people being much better trained in thinking about value? Do you feel like it’s tougher to beat the market today than it was 30 or 40 years ago?

Aswath Damodaran: Well, let’s start with the easy one: it is definitely more difficult to create a competitive advantage in this market, simply because areas of competitive advantage are slipping away.

I’ll give you a simple example: thirty-five years ago, if you were an investor, you had an advantage just being in New York City over being in Des Moines, Iowa. Why? Because the SEC offices were here, and if you wanted to look up a filing by a company, you could physically go to the SEC offices and check out that filing. You had a competitive advantage based on location. And if you worked at a major investment bank, you had access to a computer. Most people in the world did not – so if you had access to computing power and you had access to data, it gave you a leg up.

Now the investing world has become a lot flatter, especially in the US. I can’t think of too many competitive advantages that you would have at Goldman Sachs as an equity research analyst over some person sitting at their own computer. If you’re going to create value in this business now, you’ve got to think of what else you bring to the table. It can’t be that you have better data, it can’t be because you have a more powerful computer – it’s got to be something else, and that’s made investing a lot more difficult than it used to be.


VH: A lot of people are worried about the rise of indexing. Do you think that indexing has gone so far as to make markets less efficient? Robert Shiller has said that indexing is un-American, that we’re losing the ability to value and to price assets. Others have compared indexing to Marxism, arguing that indexing is worse. What do you think?

AD: Well, let’s start out by noting that many of these people who critique indexing have a very selfish reason for doing so – it’s taking away their living. And that’s for a very good reason, which is they’ve not been very good at what they do for a living and indexing has exposed that.

If I thought more of equity research analysts, I would worry more about indexing. If I really thought equity research analysts actually went out and collected information and did research and unearthed stuff about companies we did not know, then I’d be worried about indexing taking away that research. But unfortunately, that’s not what I see equity research analysts doing. They listen to management spout platitudes about the company, and mostly they take them at face value. They take an adjusted EBITDA, they slap a pricing multiple on it, they call it research. That’s not digging up anything about a company, so nothing is lost by those equity research analysts being pushed out of the business.

And let’s face it, most active investing is built on mean-reversion. It’s very lazy investing, there is no research that goes in. You just buy stocks with low PE ratios and high growth. Again, we have this vision of analysts as being people who dig for the truth – and that is still there. In fact, I would argue the payoff to doing research is probably greater with indexing than without it. I think there is this false vision of indexing becoming 100% of the market, and I refer people to the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox proposed in their 1980 paper, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,2 which states that because information is costly to obtain, if the market were informationally efficient there’d be no compensation for obtaining the information needed to make it informationally efficient in the first place.

That said, there is a potentially dark side to indexing. It has made momentum much stronger, because the nature of indexing is you pile on to whatever’s going up.


VH: Gene Fama has said that momentum is the “premier anomaly.”3 Do you agree with him, and why do you think momentum has historically worked so well across so many asset classes, both cross-sectionally and in time series?

AD: Because it reflects the reality of pricing, in that the biggest factor in pricing is what other people are doing. Investing has always been a momentum game, at least on the pricing side, and it’s about momentum and momentum shifts. Pretty much all of trading can be summarized into those two groups: you can either be a momentum player or a player who detects shifts in momentum and tries to go against momentum just before it changes. So, all of trading is built around momentum or anti-momentum. When Gene calls it an anomaly, what he means is we cannot explain it using fundamentals. It’s an anomaly –

VH: Right. So is that to say that there’s not a good risk argument behind it?

AD: No, there’s not a risk argument – but that raises a broader question of how the pricing process can be very different than the value process. The pricing process is all about mood and momentum. On any given day, it is the biggest explanatory variable for why price is moving. It’s not that cash flows change, or growth rates change, or the price of risk changes – it’s just momentum shifts.

VH: It does feel like if you were going to base a trading strategy on any one thing…

AD: It’s got to be momentum. In fact, you cannot devise a trading strategy which ignores momentum. It’s impossible.

You can create an investing strategy that’s momentum-free – but that basically means you value something and then you sit there and pray and hope that, eventually, momentum fixes the gap for you. Even those people who believe they’re value players are far more dependent on momentum than they realize, because ultimately, for them to make money, the price has to move to its value. And that may require a momentum shift, which is what we call the catalyst, something that changes the momentum of the game.


VH: Do you think there’s a distinction between momentum – which has a clear definition and has been found to be very helpful in investing – versus return chasing, which has a really bad name and is often put forward as the reason that investor returns are so much lower than fund returns.

On the surface, both of them are buying something that’s gone up and selling something that’s gone down – but there’s got to be an important fundamental difference between the two things that allows one to be the best thing that you can do, and the other to perhaps be the worst thing you can do?

AD: Because, in a sense, momentum has a light side and a dark side. The light side is when you’re riding momentum, you make a lot of money. The dark side is, eventually, momentum does shift – and if your entire investing was built on riding momentum, and the momentum shifts, you can essentially lose everything you gain plus more.

I don’t have a problem with the return chasing, if you know when to stop. And I think part of the problem is if all you do is chase returns, and you don’t even think of it as momentum, you’ve forgotten that momentum does shift. That’s why I have more respect for pure traders than I do for portfolio managers who claim to not be traders who chase returns, and then say, “Look, I don’t play the momentum game.” If you’re going to play the momentum game, play it. Play it openly.

Return chasers are more delusional. They’re delusional because, while they’re playing the momentum game, they keep telling everybody that they’re not playing the momentum game, that they’re really investors. So what they do is they chase returns and they dress it up as a value strategy, that they’re doing it because of X, Y and Z, because these companies are going to be the forefront of future growth, etc.

If you’re going to chase momentum, just chase it. Be open about it. If you’re going to chase momentum, you’ve got to get the timing right, and the problem with return chasers is they don’t realize that.


VH: Let’s talk more generally about the world of factor investing – or smart beta, as some refer to it. Can you give us your perception of the history, and what Fama and French were doing back in the late 80s and early ’90s, and how a few trillion dollars have come to be allocated to this type of investing?

AD: I think it’s interesting. There is no way that you could have sat in on Gene Fama’s class and walked out of his assessment of factors saying, “That’s a way of making excess returns,” because I can guarantee you Gene would not have framed it as such. He’d have said, “Look, we found price-to-book and market cap as factors that drove past returns,” and the way he’d have concluded would be something like, “That must mean our risk-and-return models are flawed, that price-to-book and market cap are proxies for risk, that this is not something you’re getting an excess return for.”

I like to think of the roots of factor analysis as following two different pathways. One is that when you find a factor, what you found is not a way of making excess returns, but it’s a missing risk factor that’s going to be built into your expected return analysis. The other school of thought is, if you found a factor, that’s a way in which you can build a portfolio and deliver – at least on the surface – higher returns and essentially you can attract more money.

And I think we go back and forth between these two groups, and sometimes I think we pick and choose what we want out of those. I think people have to decide what factors really are. Are they really just missing risk variables? The other school of thought basically says, “We’re going to assume that any factor that has delivered more than required is, in fact, something I can make excess returns on.”

But you can’t have it both ways, and it becomes interesting when you get a paper that treads in that grey area. One such paper, for instance, is the AQR paper on the size factor: that even though the small cap premium has disappeared over much of the last 37 years, if you screen it for really bad companies, what they call junk, then small cap companies still have excess returns. Now we’re dancing on the head of a pin, because if I really treat it as a factor in the spirit of Fama-French, there’s extra risk associated with it so here’s what I should be doing: when I value a small company I should first assess whether it’s a high quality or low quality company. And then for the high-quality companies, I should use a higher cost of capital than in discounting the cash flows for low-quality companies. That’s a really tough intuitive sell. That if I get a bad company, I should use a lower required return – but this is what happens when we don’t draw the line, when we use those factors to build this premium into a cost-to-capital. This is why I’ve never used the small cap premium in 35 years of valuation practice – because I think the minute you do that, you’re opening the door to including things in your cost-of-capital that really should not be included in there.


VH: If you were given a choice between either investing in an equity portfolio that was built around five or six of the most popular factors today, or you could invest in a portfolio that’s chosen by a hundred of your favorite valuation students selecting individual stocks, which would you prefer? Assuming all the costs are the same for both.

AD: I’m a great believer that the less activity you need to put into creating a portfolio, the better. To the extent that there are 100 different people involved, no matter what I think about them – I worry about all that activity that they did, and I’m not sure that those things are going to actually pay off in returns, because the good stuff and the bad stuff might all get averaged out. So given the binary choice I would go with the factors, but you know what? I’d go with a pure index fund over the factor one. Because here’s the thing about factors: they have existed, obviously, over the last hundred years. We can see it in the data…but I really think the world is shifting under us. There is a point to make about mean reversion: mean reversion works until it doesn’t. And much of what we do in investing now, we learned in the US on data from the second half of the 20th century. And in that time period the US market was a unique market. If you look at the history of markets over time, it was the most mean reverting, stable market of all time. And when you take the most mean-reverting, stable market of all time, all kinds of mean reversion are going to work for you.

So my concern is that maybe we’re taking rules that were developed for the most mean-reverting, stable market of all time and trying to apply them in a new world order where markets might be reverting, but we don’t know to what. And so, I have a concern with any kind of tilted approach where you’re tilting based on past data. I’m not sure the payoff is there. Maybe twenty years ago, my answer would have been different. For me, 2008 was the dividing line where I think there was a structural break in the global markets. I am less and less trusting of mean reversion on a daily basis.


VH: You write annually about long-term expected returns of the market as a whole. Can you give us a brief description of how you come up with your long term expected return for say, the US equity market, or the global equity market?

AD: I do it on a monthly basis, and I think again this goes back to what I said earlier about mean reversion. In the past the way I would compute those future expected returns was to look backwards: look at the Ibbotson data to 1926, and look at what stocks made on average over T-bonds, and make a leap of faith: if that’s what I made over the last 75 years, that’s what I should expect to make over the next seventy-five.

But as I said, so much of what we know came from the US in the 20th century, but starting about 25 years ago my faith in using historical returns started to get shakier and shakier, so I said we’d be much better if I could get a forward-looking expected return for the market. So I stole from the bond market an idea that’s been around forever: that yield to maturity is basically an internal rate of return. You take the price of the bond today, you take future cash flows, you solve for what kind of expected return you’re going to make, given what you pay.

So at the start of every month I take the S&P 500 and I look at what people are collectively paying for stocks. I do have to make projections of expected cash flow, but that’s not difficult because these are, after all, the 500 largest market cap stocks. So I solve for an internal rate of return every month, and that becomes my expected return for stocks.


VH: What do you think about what’s often described as the ‘Equity Risk Premium’ puzzle, i.e. that some econometric models suggest that the equity risk premium should be much smaller than it seems to be?

AD: I love Jeremy Siegel’s work, but I think his basic notion that ‘stocks always win in the long run’ is at the basis of this puzzle. Because if stocks always win in the long term, you know what should happen to your equity risk premium as your time horizon extends? It should go to zero.

We know stocks don’t always win in the long term, that there is this catastrophic risk. But then people point to the US and say, “Show me where it is.” You’ve got a survivor market, you take the most successful market of the 20th century and you ask me, “Show me the evidence of catastrophe.” You’re not going to find it. You’re going to have to go look at the Austrian market to find it. We think of one hundred years as a lot of data. But in the longer scheme of history, when looking at the US we’ve just caught a very, very unusual country in an unusual period of time, and we’re extrapolating from there.


VH: We only have time for one more question, so I’ve got to ask you: how you have been so prolific? Eleven books, I lost count of all the articles you’ve had published, a massive online presence, trying to get ideas and valuation techniques democratized, and hundreds of thousands of people reading and watching your teaching. And then on top of it, being a professor and getting all these awards for best professor at NYU, best business school professor in the whole country. It’s really remarkable, can you give any tips for people that are trying to be more productive?

AD: I have to tell you, I’m a pretty lazy person, I don’t work more than 40 hours per week. What I’ve discovered helps me is to not compartmentalize – because if I thought of my life as, “there’s teaching, there’s research, there’s writing on my blog, there’s X, Y and Z…” then you very quickly run out of hours in the day. But almost everything I do spills over into almost everything else I do. So I’m constantly looking for ways to take whatever I do and get it to serve three or four or five purposes.

I’ll give you an example: about five years ago I read The Wall Street Journal post on Uber. It was a Thursday afternoon, and I said, “This will be an interesting company to value.” I did a very rudimentary valuation, because I knew very little about ride sharing; it took me about three hours to do the valuation, about three hours to write the blog post. I put it up on Friday afternoon. That blog post took a day and a half of work, but it essentially became part of my classes, it became an entire seminar that I do on valuing young and startup companies, it became a book called “Narrative in Numbers.”

VH: Thank you so much for making time to share your clear and insightful thoughts with us.

AD: You’re welcome!


  1. This not is not an offer or solicitation to invest, nor should this be construed in any way as tax advice. Past returns are not indicative of future performance.
  2. American Economic Review (70); pp393-408.
  3. Fama, Eugene and French, Kenneth, Dissecting Anomalies, The Journal of Finance (August 2008).
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Sensible Investing in a Nutshell: Robin Powell, The Evidence-Based Investor, interviews Victor

March 12, 2018

In the News

Sensible Investing in a Nutshell: Robin Powell, The Evidence-Based Investor, interviews Victor

In this five-minute video Robin Powell, aka the Evidence-Based Investor, interviews Victor in his “journey to uncover the truth behind investing”. They discuss the meaning of the Puzzle of the Missing Billionaires and explore some of the reasons why investors don’t get the returns they should earn. The interview ends with Robin asking Victor: “What then would you advise young investors to do?”

Robin Powell is an award-winning financial journalist, blogger and educator in the field of investing. For the past six years, under the mantle of The Evidence-Based Investor, he has campaigned for better investor education and for greater transparency in global asset management. Prior to that, he reported for ITV and Sky News for over 20 years, after receiving his BA/MA in History from Oxford.


Disclaimer:

This video does not constitute investment advice. Past returns may not be indicative of future returns.

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New Year, New CEO, New Home

January 17, 2018

In the News

New Year, New CEO, New Home

The New Year brings two exciting developments at Elm. The first is that James White, who has been working with Elm for the past year, is taking on the role of CEO. Our founder, Victor, will remain CIO and focus on devoting his time to research, writing and spending more time with investors. The second change is that James and our main office will, in the near future, be moving to Philadelphia.

Our New CEO

James studied Math at the University of Chicago, before taking a job at NationsBank’s recently acquired CRT unit (Chicago Research and Trading, a pioneer in options trading), working on their trading systems and quantitative models. He then joined Citadel in fixed income trading. In 2008, James left Citadel, and along with two partners ran a small private equity investment pool, focused mostly in Asia, and through which he held a number of executive operational roles with their portfolio companies.

James’ involvement with Elm started off with him joining our investor group about a year ago. It was through this that Victor and James started to write research notes together. In the past year, they’ve published more than a dozen on our blog as well as SSRN.com and Bloomberg. This collaboration grew into James agreeing to build an industrial-strength, state-of-the-art investment and portfolio management system for Elm, replacing our mostly spreadsheet-based systems. This Python and SQL- based system is named Ulmus (the plant-family genus for the Elm), and not only is it more scalable and secure than our previous systems, it also has significantly more functionality and allows Elm to manage our portfolios with greater cost and tax efficiency.

Hello Philadelphia

The second big development is that James and our main office will soon be in Philadelphia. Why Philadelphia? Besides cost-efficiency and proximity to NYC and our many investors in the tri-state area, it’s a great city! Check out this short clip that the city prepared to convince Amazon to choose Philly as its headquarters.

Growth in 2017

James will be a big help in managing our growth, which was significant in 2017. Our growth was thanks primarily to referrals and top-ups from our existing investors, which we very much appreciate. Investment returns of around 19% helped too. Our investor group and the assets we’re managing both grew by over 50% to over 225 investors and $600mm of assets. While the majority of our investors are finance professionals, our investor base is geographically diverse, spanning half the states in the U.S., and about a quarter comes from outside the U.S.

With best wishes for a healthy and happy 2018,

  – Victor, James and the entire Elm team

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Elm in the Wall Street Journal

November 14, 2017

In the News

Elm in the Wall Street Journal

Wall Street Journal writer Sam Goldfarb writes about Elm Partners and Victor for the cover of the B Section on November 11th.

“Since 2011, Mr. Haghani has run, from a small office near his home in London, Elm Partners Management LLC, an investment firm that now manages around $550 million of assets. Using a simple algorithm, the firm takes into account valuations and momentum to invest in index and exchange-traded funds across different asset classes.”

Read the full article here.

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Elm research wins William F. Sharpe Award 2017

October 1, 2017

In the News

Elm research wins William F. Sharpe Award 2017

The Journal of Portfolio Management recently published Elm’s research paper “Do Index Buyers Make Overvalued Stocks More Overvalued?”

We must have said something that sounded insightful, because the note was awarded the William F. Sharpe award for Institutional Investor Journals Paper of the Year on indexing and ETFs.

You can view the paper here.

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Elm coin-flipping Research discussed in Economist Buttonwood article

September 26, 2017

In the News

Elm coin-flipping Research discussed in Economist Buttonwood article

From The Economist:

“Who wants mediocrity? That is what a lot of people say when the subject of index-tracking, or passive fund management, comes up. They would rather choose a fund manager (an active manager in the jargon) who tries to beat the market by picking the best stocks. It does sound like a good idea.”

Read the full article on Economist.com.

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